From a traditional moral point of view, business practitioners often seem overly concerned about the behavior of their peers in deciding how they ought to act. We propose to account for this concern by introducing a mutual trust perspective, where moral obligations are grounded in a sense of trust that others will abide by the same rules. when grounds for trust are absent, the obligation is weakened. We illustrate this perspective by examining the widespread ambivalence with regard to deception about (...) one's settlement preferences in negotiation. On an abstract level, such deception generally seems undesirable, though in many individual cases it is condoned, even admired as shrewd bargaining. Because of the difficulty in verifying someone's settlement preferences, it is hard to establish a basis for trusting the revelations of the other party, especially in competitive negotiations with relative strangers. (shrink)

In a competitive and morally imperfect world, business people are often faced with serious ethical challenges. Harboring suspicions about the ethics of others, many feel justified in engaging in less-than-ideal conduct to protect their own interests. The most sophisticated moral arguments are unlikely to counteract this behavior. We believe that this morally defensive behavior is responsible, in large part, for much undesirable deception in negotiation. Drawing on recent work in the literature of negotiations, we present some practical guidance on how (...) negotiators might build trust, establish common interests, and secure credibility for their statements, thereby promoting honesty. We also point out the types of social and institutional arrangements, many of which have become commonplace, that work to promote credibility, trust, and honesty in business dealings. Our approach is offered not only as a specific response to the problem of deception in negotiation, but as one model of how research in business ethics might offer constructive advice to practitioners. (shrink)

In 1969 Robert Nozick published the first extensive philosophical analysis of the concept of coercion. His analysis has since generated a great deal of controversy. This dissertation is an attempt to resolve much of the controversy. It begins with a detailed review of recent work on coercion. Based on the lessons learned in this review, a new theory of coercion and its ethics is proposed. The theory identifies the essential features of a coerced choice and distinguishes several senses in which (...) we might say that someone is coerced. By allowing for different senses of coercion with a common core, the theory is able to account for examples that are problematic without losing sight of valuable distinctions. For instance, one particularly controversial group of examples involves offers that appear to be coercive, even when no threat is present. The new theory allows many of these offers to be termed coercive, but not in the same strict sense that is associated with coercive threats. The treatment of the ethics of coercion that is presented in this dissertation is more comprehensive than any previous treatment of the topic. It challenges some commonly held beliefs. Most significantly, it challenges the belief that coercion is in itself a great moral evil. Many instances of coercion involve no moral violation. Immoral instances of coercion are generally immoral, not because of the coercion per se, but because of other morally objectionable features of the situation. The dissertation ends with an application of the new theory of coercion and its ethics to a public policy problem of current interest. (shrink)

Two cultures are at play in the field of social entrepreneurship: an age-old culture of charity, and a more contemporary culture of entrepreneurial problem solving. These cultures permeate activities from resource providers to front line operations. Both have roots in our psychological responses to the needs of others and are reinforced by social norms. They can work hand-in-hand or they can be at odds. Some of the icons of the social entrepreneurship movement have spoken harshly about charity, yet most of (...) them rely to some degree, at least early in their development process, on resources that are given out of a charitable impulse. The success of social entrepreneurship requires an integration of values from each of these cultures, in which the satisfactions of giving are correlated with social benefits of rigorous problem solving. (shrink)